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KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE BIRDIE: AIRCRAFT
ENGINE BIRD INGESTION
ROBERT ANTHONY MICHAEL
B IRDS ARE ONE of the most serious and persistent
natural threats to aircraft at airports throughout the
world.' Aviators have long recognized that flocks of birds
at or near airports are a safety hazard.2 During the early
years of aviation, birds easily avoided the comparatively
slow flying aircraft. But the problem, generally referred
to as "bird strike,"4 has increased with the speeds of mod-
ern aircraft and is a particular hazard to turboprop and jet
aircraft. 5 Bird strikes, however, are not well publicized,
possibly due to the fact that there has not been a fatal air
carrier accident involving birds in the United States in
more than twenty years. 6 One expert stated: "Maybe peo-
ple don't care because we haven't lost an airliner full of
passengers to a bird strike in a while." 7
In the United States, more than 1,400 bird strikes occur
each year.8 Bird strikes cause an estimated twenty million
Graham, Birdland: Confrontation In The Skies, AUDOBON, Jan. 1983, at 22.
2 10 N.T.S.B. ANN. REP. 15 (1976).
.1 Graham, supra note 1, at 22. However, a prominent transcontinental pilot
named Calbram "Cal" Perry Rodgers was killed at Long Beach, California, in
1912, when the carcass of a gull he had struck jammed the exposed control cables
of his biplane. Id.
4 Hingorani, Air Disasters, 9 AIR L. 100, 102 (1984). The problem is also called
"BASH" (Bird Aircraft Strike Hazard). Id. at 102.
- Graham, supra note 1, at 22. The increase in bird strikes is also due to the
large diameter ofjet engines. Id. Helicopters are also subject to bird strikes.
o Steenblik, Battling The Birds, AIRLINE PILOT, Jan. 1985, at 23.
7 Id.
8 Graham, supra note 1, at 22. This figure applies to civil aviation. Military
aircraft, which frequently fly high speed, low level missions, have a greater inci-
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dollars in damage annually to aircraft, together with the
possibility of injury or death to crew and passengers. 9
Birds may endanger the flight of a turboprop or jet air-
craft, particularly at a crucial stage such as landing or
take-off, when birds are sucked into the turbine induction
system causing the engine to fail or malfunction."0
This article addresses the hazard posed to aircraft when
birds are ingested into aircraft engines."I The federal reg-
ulations that attempt to prevent bird ingestion through
powerplant design and construction, and the regulations
concerning bird hazard reduction at airports will be ex-
plored. 12 The article will also discuss the reported deci-
sions involving aircraft crashes caused by bird ingestion,
focusing on the various theories of liability proposed by
dence of bird strikes. In 1983, over 2,300 strikes were reported by the Air Force
Bird/Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) Team, located at Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida, which, since 1975, has been responsible for maintaining all Air Force
Bird/Aircraft strike data. Kull, 1983 Air Force Bird Strikes, in PROCEEDINGS, CON-
FERENCE, AND TRAINING WORKSHOP ON WILDLIFE HAZARDS TO AIRCRAFT, at 49
(1984) [hereinafter cited as WILDLIFE HAZARDS].
9 Graham, supra note 1, at 22. The principal dangers of bird strikes are colli-
sions with windshields (also referred to as cockpit intrusion or penetration), tail
structures, and engine ingestion. See Steenblik, supra note 6, at 18. While birds are
not generally viewed as dangerous objects, a four pound bird hitting an aircraft at
two hundred miles per hour impacts with a force of nine tons. Safety Corner, AOPA
PILOT, Nov. 1973, at 83.
lo 10 N.T.S.B. ANN. REP. 15 (1976). While cockpit intrusion can be fatal, en-
gine ingestion is viewed as the more serious threat. The problem is described as
follows:
The engines of these planes have large intake openings which are
likely to ingest birds. The birds, when ingested, may damage one or
more of the rotating blades of an engine which, in turn, break off or
bend the other rotating blades in the engine. The result is that the
compressors in the engine become inoperative and the plane loses
its power.
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. City of New Haven, 574 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D. Conn.
1983).
"There is concern that the bird ingestion problem may become more serious as
new-generation turbofan-powered [commercial] aircraft with only two engines be-
comes [sic] operational in significant numbers over the next several years." Birds
v. Aircraft: No Winners, 39 ACCIDENT PREVENTION BULLETIN, FLIGHT SAFETY FOUN-
DATION (Feb. 1982).
" While the focus of this article is aircraft engine bird ingestion, the theories
presented are applicable to incidents involving bird strike to other aircraft
strucures. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
plaintiffs and the legal defenses available.13 Finally, possi-
ble methods and procedures for avoiding bird ingestion
and subsequent litigation will be suggested.' 4
I. FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Federal regulations recognize the hazard that birds
pose to aircraft by requiring aircraft engines to continue
operation following bird ingestion.' 5 Since the possibility
of bird ingestion is most prevalent, and dangerous, at
take-off and landing, the regulations make it clear that the
most effective method for preventing bird ingestion is re-
ducing the hazard at the airport.' 6 Limiting or prevent-
ing the presence of birds at airports lessens the likelihood
that birds will constitute a serious hazard to aircraft.'
7
A. Powerplant Regulations
The ingestion of foreign matter, particularly birds, into
an aircraft engine is a recognized hazard which must be
considered in the design and construction of turboprop
or jet turbine engines.' 8 Prior to the issuance of an en-
gine type certificate, the engine must comply with the reg-
ulations pertaining to foreign object ingestion.' 9 The
regulations require that the engine manufacturer design
and locate or protect the air induction system of the tur-
bine engine to minimize the ingestion of foreign matter
during take-off, landing, and taxiing. 20
The common kinds of foreign matter ingested into en-
Is See infra notes 32-171 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 189-196 and accompanying text.
is See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. "80% of reported bird strikes
occur on or near airports - usually below 2,000 feet a.g.l." Horne, Safety Corner:
Feathers in the Fan, AOPA PILOT, June 1983, at 126.
17 "Scores of species have been involved in bird strikes, but a fiew types pose
most of the threat. According to the FAA, gulls (which come in 44 species world-
wide) account for 40 to 43 percent of all strikes reported; migratory waterfowl
(primarily ducks and geese) about 11 percent." Steenblik, supra note 6, at 20.
i8 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 25.903(a)(2)(i,ii) (1985).
14 C.F.R. § 25.903(a)(2)(i,ii) (1985).
14 C.F.R. § 25.1091(d)(2) (1985).
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gines are ice, hail, water, and birds.2' The regulations
require bird ingestion tests using three sizes of birds.22 A
turbine engine must withstand the ingestion of a four
pound bird without catching fire, bursting (releasing
hazardous fragments through the engine case), generat-
ing loads greater than ultimate loads, or losing the capa-
bility of being shut down.23 The engine must also be able
to withstand the ingestion of three ounce birds and one
and one-half pound birds without sustaining a twenty-five
percent power or thrust loss, requiring the shut down of
21 14 C.F.R. § 33.77(e) (1985). Sand and gravel were included in the foreign
object ingestion regulations, but deleted when it was determined that sand and
gravel ingestion did not constitute a serious power loss threat. See 49 Fed. Reg.
6841 (1984).
22 14 C.F.R. § 33.77 (1985). The manufacturer must test an engine under the
following ingestion conditions:
Foreign object Test quantity Speed of foreign Engine operation Ingestion
object
Birds
Three Ounce Bird One for each 50 square Liftoff speed Takeoff In rapid sequence
inches of inlet area or of typical to simulate a
fraction thereof up to a aircraft flock encounter
maximum of 16 birds, and aimed at
Three ounce bird selected critical
ingestion not required areas.
if a one and one half
pound bird will pass
the inlet guide vanes
into the rotor blades.
One and One One for the first 300 Initial climb Takeoff In rapid sequence
Hall Pound Bird square inches of inlet speed of to simulate a
area, if it can enter the typical aircraft, flock encounter
inlet, plus one for each and aimed at
additional 600 square selected critical
inches of inlet area or areas.
fraction thereof tip to a
maximum of eight
birds.
Four Poutd Size One, if it can enter (I) Maximum (I) Maximum (I) Aimed at





(2) liftiolf speed (2) Takeoff (2) Aimed at






To perform the bird ingestion test, a bird is fired from a special cannon into the
inlet of an engine operating at takeoff power. Horne, supra note 16, at 126.
23 14 C.F.R. § 33.77(a)(1-4) (1985).
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the engine within five minutes from the time of ingestion,
or resulting in a potentially hazardous condition.24
B. Airport Regulations
The government began its airport certification program
in 1972.25 All airports serving any scheduled or un-
scheduled passenger operation of an air carrier conducted
with an aircraft having a seating capacity of more than
thirty passengers must have an airport operating certifi-
cate. 26 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will is-
sue a certificate if, after investigation, the FAA finds that
the airport is properly and adequately equipped and able
to conduct a safe operation. 2 An applicant for an airport
operating certificate must establish instructions and pro-
cedures for the prevention or removal of factors at the air-
port that attract, or may attract, birds.28 However, an
applicant need not establish these instructions and proce-
dures if the FAA finds that a bird hazard does not exist
and is not likely to exist.29 Furthermore, an applicant for
an airport operating certificate must show that it has ap-
propriate procedures for identifying, assessing, and dis-
seminating information to air carrier users of the airport
by "Notices to Airmen" (NOTAM) or other such means,
concerning conditions on and in the vicinity of the airport
that effect or may effect the safe operation of aircraft."
The procedures must cover the presence of a large
number of birds.A
24 Id. at § 33.77(b)(1-3). Other aircraft structures must be able to withstand
collision with birds. See 14 C.F.R. § 25.631 (1985), which provides that the "em-
pennage structure must be designed to assure capability of continued safe flight
and landing after impact with an 8 pound bird." Id.
25 See N.T.S.B. Rep. No. NTSB/SS-84/02 Safety Study Airport Certification & Opera-
tions 4 (1984).
2 14 C.F.R. § 139.3 (1985).
27 14 C.F.R. § 139.11(b) (1985).
' 14 C.F.R. § 139.67 (1985). This section is titled "Bird Hazard Reduction."
Id. Birds are attracted to airfields by open space, food, shelter, and water.
Solman, Birds and Aviation in WILDLIFE HAZARDS, supra note 8, at 1.
'1 14 C.F.R. § 139.67 (1985).
so Id. at § 139.69.
- Id. at § 139.69(b)(7).
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II. BIRD INGESTION CRASHES & CASES
Bird ingestion litigation is a relatively new development
in aviation tort law.32 As a result, there are few reported
decisions discussing the feathery menace to aviation. 3
However, the existing body of bird ingestion case law may
be misleading due to recent developments which vitiate
prior theories of liability presented in the reported deci-
sions.34 The modern decisions reflect a trend of placing
liability for bird ingestion on the airport operator and the
pilot.
A. Early Decisions
1. t"he "Boston Electra'" Litigation
The first major aircraft crash caused by bird ingestion
was the October 4, 1960 crash of a Lockheed Electra at
Boston's Logan International Airport. 5  The crash,
caused by engine ingestion of starlings and gulls, resulted
in over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful
death against the airline, the aircraft and engine manufac-
turers, the United States, and the airport operator. 6 Rapp
v. Eastern Airlines discusses liability for the crash. While
the decision is less than satisfying in that it is written as
findings of fact and conclusions of law, Rapp is the seminal
32 See 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 10:5, at 582 (1978).
33 In Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967), bird strike was presented as a defense. The airline argued that a bird
strike momentarily distracted the crew making it impossible to execute a missed
approach. A dead bird was found near the crashsite but this was "hardly convinc-
ing proof that it was the cause of the accident" since the bird had been dead three
or four days before the crash. Id. at 232-33.
.4 See infra notes 174-182 and accompanying text.
• Hingorani, supra note 4, at 102.
3, Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, 253 F. Supp. 244, 245 (E.D. Penn. 1966). How-
ever, the "Boston Electra" crash is best known for the litigation concerning fed-
eral change of venue provisions. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612
(1964) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948)).
.11 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Penn.), afld, 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968), vacated by agreement and without opinion, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1970). Fifty-nine passengers and three crew died. There were only ten survivors.
Id. at 675.
decision because it catalogues the theories of liability that
appeared in early bird ingestion cases.
The sole issue decided by the Rapp court concerned the
liability of the United States .3  The plaintiffs raised four
theories of government liability for the crash 9.3  First, the
plaintiffs claimed that the FAA issued a certificate of air-
worthiness for a plane that it knew or should have known
would ingest birds on take-off, resulting in the loss of
power at a critical period of the flight.40 Second, the
plaintiffs alleged that the FAA negligently issued a certifi-
cate of airworthiness for a plane that it knew or should
have known would ingest birds on take-off, with no limita-
tions in the certificate against the use of that plane where
birds were likely to be encountered. 4' Third, it was al-
leged that the FAA acted negligently in failing to require
the airport operator to remove from the airport premises
ponds, weeds, and a garbage dump which the FAA knew
or should have known attracted birds. 42 Finally, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the FAA negligently permitted the air-
craft to take-off under conditions then existing at the
airport without some protection or inspection when they
knew or should have known that birds were a hazard and
could damage the aircraft.43 The Government answered
that there was no hazard, and even if there were, no rea-
son existed to suspect that the accident would occur.44 In
response to the allegations of negligently certifying the
engine and aircraft, the Government argued that the reg-
ulations set minimum standards, and if these minimum
-1 Rapp, 264 F. Supp. at 680-81.
-' Id. at 679.
4o Id. Prior to certification, the FAA required engines to be subjected to the
chicken test. The chicken test consisted of injecting four pound chicken carcasses
into the engine to determine the effect of bird ingestion. The test conducted on
the Electra's engines indicated bird ingestion could cause internal damage result-
ing in power loss. Id. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for the present bird
ingestion test requirements.
4 Rapp, 264 F. Supp. at 679.
42 Id.
41 Id. The court based the FAA's knowledge on a 1949 study of bird strikes in
commercial aviation. Id. at 677.
44 Id. at 679.
10131986] COMMENT
1014 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
standards were met, the Government was justified in issu-
ing the certificates.4 5
In determining the liability issue, the court applied gen-
eral negligence principles.46 The district court held that
the FAA was negligent in issuing a type certificate for the
aircraft attesting to its airworthiness when the FAA knew
the engine was capable of ingesting birds on take-off and
that the resulting loss of power could pose a serious
threat to the aircraft.4 7 The district court also found that
the FAA negligently failed to require the airport operator
to remove the attractions to birds at the airport. 48 How-
ever, the opinion was subsequently vacated by agree-
ment, 49 and is not considered to have precedential
value. 50 The opinion is nonetheless noteworthy in that,
up to 1984, it provided an argument for the imposition of
liability upon the United States for negligent
certification.5'
2. The "Executive Aviation" Litigation
On July 28, 1968, a Falcon Mystere jet struck a flock of
gulls seconds after take-off from Burke Lakefront Airport
45 Id.
46 Id. at 680. The court stated:
We of course must place ourselves in the perspective of a jury in
deciding this case. Needless to say, we would advise them, that gen-
erally speaking and without detail, negligence is the doing of some
act which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure
so to do; that ordinary care is such as a person would exercise in the
management of his own affairs to avoid injury to the person or prop-
erty of others. We would also ask them to consider the reasonable
foreseeability of an event looking back to the negligent act if it ex-
isted, and whether they should have reasonably envisioned the
events which unfolded and caused the accident.
ld.
I7 Id. at 680.
48 Id. at 681.
49 See 521 F.2d 1379 (3d Cir. 1970).
50 Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362 (11 th Cir. 1983). "Rapp was vacated
and has no precedential value. At the most, the Rapp holding would only be per-
suasive." Id. at 1366.
." See infra notes 172-182 and accompanying text.
in Cleveland, Ohio.5 2 The plane suffered a substantial
loss of power, struck the airport perimeter fence, hit a
pick-up truck, and finally came to rest in Lake Erie.53
While no one was injured, the soaked aircraft was a total
loss. 54 The named defendants were the municipal airport
operator, the airport manager, and the air traffic control-
ler on duty at the time of the accident. 55
The complaint, filed in admiralty, alleged that the loss
of the aircraft resulted from the airport operator's negli-
gence in clearing the aircraft for takeoff, in failing to warn
plaintiffs of the seagulls on the runway, and in failing to
remove the seagulls from the runway.56 The court dis-
missed the action for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, be-
cause the alleged tort did not have a maritime locality. 57
The United States Supreme Court, in an unanimous opin-
ion, held that federal admiralty jurisdiction does not ex-
tend to aviation tort claims arising from flights between
points within the continental United States.58 While the
issue of liability was not addressed, the district court opin-
ion is noteworthy in its listing of possible theories and
defendants .
3. The "Miree" Litigation
On February 26, 1973, a Lear jet crashed shortly after
take-off from the DeKalb-Peachtree Airport in Georgia.6"
The crash was caused by the ingestion of cowbirds that
were attracted to the airport area in large numbers by an
.52 Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.
1971), affd. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).




57 Id. at 154. The court stated: "[Tihe dispositive issue is whether the alleged
tort arose on land or on navigable water." Id. at 152. The court concluded the
alleged tort occurred on land. Id.
- 409 U.S. 249, 274 (1972). The suit was brought in admiralty to invoke fed-
eral jurisdiction. Id. at 273 n.24.
.19 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
- Miree v. United States, 526 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976).
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adjacent county garbage dump.6 All on board the air-
craft died; the plane was destroyed, burning jet fuel fall-
ing from the disabled plane severely burned an individual
on the ground, and property at the crash site was exten-
sively damaged. 62 The plaintiffs asserted theories of neg-
ligence and nuisance.63  The plaintiffs also sued for
breach of a contract entered into by the FAA and the
county under the Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 (AADA). 64  The plaintiffs also argued that the
county's purchase of liability insurance waived the immu-
nity defense.65 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia deemed the county immune
from suit and dismissed the actions.66 The district court
-, Id. The Miree crash prompted the FAA to issue Order 5200.4 in 1974 to
attempt to deal with the hazard posed by garbage dumps located near airports.
See Harrison, FAA Policy Regarding Solid Waste Disposal Facilities in WILDLIFE
HAZARDS, supra note 8, at 213.
';' Miree, 529 F.2d at 681.
-3 Id.
- Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219, repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-748, tit. V, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 695 (1982)(codified at
49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982)). The AADA provided in part that:
As a condition precedent to his approval of a project, the Adminis-
trator shall receive in writing, satisfactory to him that . . . [T]he ae-
rial approaches to such airport will be adequately cleared and
protected by removing, marking, or lighting, or otherwise mitigating
exisiting airport hazards and by preventing the establishment or cre-
ation of future airport hazards.
49 U.S.C. § 1701(3). "Airport Hazard" was defined as:
[Any structure or object of natural growth located on or in the vi-
cinity of a public airport, or any use of land near such airport, which
obstructs the airspace required for the flight of aircraft in landing or
taking off at such airport or is otherwise hazardous to such landing
and takeoff of aircraft.
Id. at § 1711 (1982). The Act was re-enacted and re-codified in 1982. See The
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 671
(1982)(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 2201 (1986)).
6,5 Miree, 529 F.2d at 686. See generally C. RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE LAW 59
(19 7 9)(listing cases where immunity was waived by procurement of liability
insurance).
, Miree, 529 F.2d at 679. County immunity was provided for by GA. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1502 (1971). "A county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless
made so by statute." Id. Under the doctrine of "sovereign immunity," a govern-
ment cannot be sued by one of its subjects unless it consents to the suit. The
doctrine is based upon the English maxim "the King can do no wrong." See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, at 970 (4th ed. 1971).
also found that under Georgia law, the purchase of liabil-
ity insurance neither waives the immunity of the county
nor creates a direct cause of action against the insured.67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed that the county was immune from suit on theories
of negligence, nuisance, and insurance, but ruled that the
county could be liable on the theory that the plaintiffs
were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the
FAA and the county, in which the county agreed to oper-
ate the airport safely.68 The Fifth Circuit, en banc,
granted rehearing and held that federal, not state law,
controlled in determining whether the plaintiffs were
third-party beneficiaries of the contract and ruled that
federal law barred the third-party beneficiary action.69
The United States Supreme Court vacated the en banc
decision and held that state law applied rather than fed-
eral law.7' The Court remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion under Georgia law. 7 1 The Court justified its decision
on the fact that only the rights of private litigants were at
issue and that no duties of the United States hinged on
the outcome of the litigation.72 The Court did acknowl-
edge the argument that such lawsuits could "be thought
to advance federal aviation policy by inducing compliance
with FAA safety provisions."7 On remand, the Fifth Cir-
cuit certified questions for submission to the Supreme
Court of Georgia to determine whether the county was
immune from suit under the third-party beneficiary the-
ory.74 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the action
could not be maintained against the county.75
67 Miree, 526 F.2d at 686.
68 Id.
69 Miree v. United States, 538 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1976).
70 Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 26 (1977).
71 Id. at 33.
72 Id. at 30-31.
7 Id. at 32. The Court did not find this argument convincing since 'the issue of
whether to displace state law on an issue such as this is primarily a decision for
Congress." Id.
74 Miree v. United States, 565 F.2d 1354, 1355 (5th Cir. 1978).
7- Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573, 578-80 (1978). The
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In subsequent Miree proceedings,76 the county airport
manager, a named defendant in the original litigation,
moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity be-
cause of his status as an official of the county. 7 7  The dis-
trict court stated that the immunity issue would be
resolved by determining whether the airport manager's
actions were discretionary or ministerial acts. 78 The court
stated that a public official enjoys protection from liability
in the performance of his discretionary duties, but under-
takes ministerial acts at his own risk.79 In reviewing the
airport manager's efforts to control the bird hazard prob-
lem, the court noted that the manager had the responsi-
bility to abate or mitigate the hazard the birds posed.s
The court did not consider this responsibility to be a dis-
cretionary duty.8 ' The district court denied summary
judgment, finding that the manager could be held liable
for failing to take precautions possible at his level to end
the bird hazard.82
court stated: "The mere fact that a member of the public would have benefited
from the performance does not create third party intended beneficiary status
under Georgia law." 249 S.E.2d at 580. The Miree decision was considered dis-
positive of the issues raised in the related case of Sellfors v. DeKalb County, 157
Ga. App. 731, 278 S.E.2d 489 (1981), even though Miree was an advisory opinion
not binding on the Georgia Court of Appeals. 278 S.E.2d at 490. Mr. Sellfors
piloted the ill-fated Lear jet that gave rise to the Miree litigation. Id.
7- Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
77 Id. at 771.
78 Id. at 772-74. The court stated:
A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and defi-
nite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and re-
quiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act,
however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judg-
ment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned
conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.
This dichotomy is maintained, for the most part, by stressing the
nature of the act involved, the degree of responsibility entrusted to
the offical, and his position in his employer's hierarchy.
Id. at 774.
71, Id. at 772-73.
o Id. at 774-75.
8 Id.
82 Id. at 775 n. I.
In Selifors v. United States,8 3 the plaintiff brought suit al-
leging government negligence for failure to enforce statu-
tory obligations under the AADA. * The plaintiff also
alleged negligence on the part of the FAA air traffic con-
trollers on duty at the time of the crash for failing to ob-
serve and warn of the presence of birds near the runway."
The trial court dismissed the action, finding no evidence
to indicate that the controllers had sighted any birds, and
found that the AADA would not support the plaintiffs
claim.8 6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the de-
ceased pilot was fully aware of the bird hazard at the air-
port.8" Additionally, the court noted that the aviation
flight charts (Jeppeson charts) in the deceased pilot's pos-
session contained the bird hazard warning."8 The Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the finding that the air traffic
controllers were not negligent in failing to warn the pilot,
since no birds were sighted by the controllers prior to the
accident.89 The Eleventh Circuit considered the allega-
tion that liability was created under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) for negligent failure of the FAA to en-
force compliance of the airport operator's contractual as-
surances in the AADA. 90 The Government contended
83 697 F.2d 1363 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3571 (1984), discussed in
Dolley, Barber & Scott, Airport Law, 15 URB. LAw. 775, 782 (1983).
84 Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219, repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-748, tit. V, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 695 (1982)(originally
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982)). See supra note 64 for the pertinent part of the
Act.
5 Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1364.
X6 Id.
' Id. The fatal crash occurred on Sellfors' second flight from the airport that
day. Id.
88 Id. The warning read: "Turbojet take otis between 5 p.m. and 30 minutes
after sunset prohibited. High density bird activity between 5 p.m. and 30 minutes
after sunset." Safety Corner, AOPA PILOT, Nov. 1973, at 82. The accident occurred
at 10 a.m. Id.
89 Id. at 1365.
- Id. at 1364. The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1982), waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a pri-
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that the FAA owed no duty of care to the pilot, and that, if
a duty existed, the acts or omissions complained of fell
within the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA.91
The court reviewed the legislative history of the AADA
and found no congressional intent for the AADA to create
any duties owed by the the Government owed to private
individuals using sponsored airport facilities.92 The court
stated that the purpose of the AADA was to provide fed-
eral funds for developing and modernizing airports and
related facilities in conjunction with a national transporta-
tion policy, not to regulate the operation of airports.93
The legislative history showed no intent on the part of
Congress to impose a legal duty on the FAA, running to
each user of a federally funded airport, to insure the abso-
lute safety of each facility constructed or maintained with
federal funds.94 The court held that the AADA does not
create a statutory duty in the federal government to pro-
tect private persons using federally-funded airports. 95
Similarly, the court found no basis for imposing liabil-
ity on the Government under the "Good Samaritan" doc-
trine.96  The court noted that interpretations of the
vate person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
:) Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1365.
92 Id. at 1366.
93 Id.
Id.
"- Id. at 1367.
96 Id. See generally Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)(The
Coast Guard undertook operation of a lighthouse. Suit was brought by a boat
owner who had relied on the guidance of the lighthouse and wrecked while the
light was not working. The Court held that once operation had begun, the Coast
Guard had a duty to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in work-
ing order.) See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) which pro-
vides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
service to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to
the other for physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reason-
able care to perform the undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm,
or
doctrine have uniformly held that where one does not cre-
ate the dangerous condition and takes no remedial meas-
ures, one is not liable as a good samaritan.9 7 The court
concluded that the FTCA did not apply, and affirmed the
dismissal of the suit.98
4. The "Hawaiian Airlines" Litigation
In Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. United States,99 a Lockheed
Electra L-188 sustained damage on July 3, 1977, when
the aircraft ingested egrets into two engines while land-
ing at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. 00 The plaintiff
asserted that the Government was negligent in permitting
conditions to exist at Patrick that encouraged the nesting
of birds, in permitting birds to nest at or near the facility,
particularly the runways, and in failing to divert or delay
the landing of the aircraft until the birds had left the
area. 10 1
The plaintiff brought the suit under the FTCA. 0 2
Under Florida law, the airport operator has the duty "to
use proper care, precaution and diligence in providing
and maintaining the air field in a reasonably safe condi-
tion for the purposes to which it is adopted and is appar-
ently designed to be used." 10 3 The court, recognizing that
"there is a problem at most every airport with birds,"
noted that Patrick has an Airfield Operations Branch
charged with the duty to implement the bird control
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance on the
undertaking.
Id.
97 Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1368.
98 Id.
-' 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,744 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 1981).
Id. at 17,745. The same type aircraft was involved in the "Boston Electra"
crash. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
0, Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,745.
'2 See supra note 90 for the text of the FTCA.
1o, Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,745 (citing Peavy v. City of Miami,
1 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1941)). See generally 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION
TORT LAW § 21:1, at 592-600 (1979)(discussing general principles of airport
liability).
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program. 0 4
The program in force at Patrick required airport per-
sonnel to report the observation of birds at the airfield.'0 5
A vehicle equipped with a radio and loudspeaker system
played tapes containing sounds of a dying sea gull and the
sound of a firing pistol. 10 6 A shotgun and a permit to kill
birds were obtained. 0 7 When birds were sighted or re-
ported, employees drove the vehicle to the area, played
the tapes, and fired the gun to disperse the birds.'0 8 The
airfield was inspected more than once each day. 10 9 "No-
tices to Airmen" (NOTAMs) were routinely issued to pi-
lots stating: "Caution, birds can be expected in or near
the airfield." 0
The district court stated that the "defendant was re-
quired to exercise reasonable care to maintain and oper-
ate the airfield in a reasonably safe manner, to warn
aircraft of any known danger such as the existence of
birds on or near the runway, and to use proper precaution
and care to keep the runways free of any such birds."''
Reviewing the bird control program, the court found that
the government had used proper care and diligence in
maintaining and operating the airfield." 12 The court ac-
cordingly dismissed the complaint.'1 3
- Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,746.
105 Id.
1o6 Id.
107 Id. An Airport Depredation Permit must be obtained from the Department
of the Interior, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, to shoot migratory birds which are
protected by federal law. See The Feather Curtain, FAA GENERAL AVIATION NEWS,
July-August 1984 at 10.
,o, Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,746.
109 Id.
1 o Id. The court also stated that information concerning a bird hazard could be
communicated to incoming pilots by use of Air Traffic Information Services
(ATIS). Id. Pilots can be warned of birds in flight since large flocks of birds will
show up on radar. See Horne, snpra note 16, at 129.
11 Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,746. There were approximately
one hundred thousand operations a year from Patrick and bird strikes were "very
minimal." Id.
112 Id. at 17,746-47.
I's Id.
B. The Modern Trend
In Safeco Insurance Co. v. City of Watertown,'14 a Saberliner
jet crashed at Watertown Municipal Airport, South Da-
kota, on June 14, 1975, after ingesting gulls into both en-
gines. 115 The pilot, co-pilot, and one passenger were
injured; the aircraft was a total loss.' 6 The plaintiff's first
ground for recovery alleged that the FAA negligently cer-
tified the airport and subsequently failed to enforce its
airport certification regulations.' 17
The plaintiff brought suit under the FTCA, contending
that the airport certification regulations imposed a duty
on the Government." 8 However, the court stated that a
regulation which does not purport to establish civil liabil-
ity, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or
welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a civil
liability construction." 9 The court did suggest that liabil-
ity could be imposed on the Government under factual
circumstances falling within the good samaritan doc-
trine.1 20 The court stated that the defendant "in some
positive way must have contributed to the injury, either by
increasing risk of harm, . . . by interposing himself be-
tween another person and the duty that the other person
owed to someone else, .. or by inducing reliance on his
undertaking."1 21
In applying the doctrine to the facts in Safeco, the court
found the crucial inquiry to be whether the Government's
inspection of the airport created a duty under South Da-
114 529 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.D. 1981) (discussed in Dolley, Barker & Kinner, Air-
port Law 15 URB. LAw. 775, 781-82 (1981)).
"'5 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1222.
I16 Id.
", Id. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for the airport regulations
found in 14 C.F.R. §§ 139.1-139.127 (1985).
1 18 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1223. See supra note 90 for the applicable provision of
the FTCA.
119 Id.
,20 Id. at 1224. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
good samaritan doctrine.
121 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1224.
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kota law.' 22 The district court found that the plaintiff
failed to prove the elements of the good samaritan doc-
trine since the plaintiff could not prove that the FAA's
certification and inspection program increased the risk of
bird strikes at. certificated airports. 23 The court stated
that pilots generally rely on the airport operator, rather
than the Government, to ensure that an airport is free of
hazards. 24 The court rejected the theory that the airport
certification regulations imposed any duty on the Govern-
ment that would give rise to a tort action.1 25
The plaintiff also alleged negligence on the part of the
airport operator. 26 The court stated the elements of a
negligence action to be: "That there be a duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, that there was a breach of
this duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury."'' 27  The court had no difficulty in
finding that the airport operator had a duty, independent
of federal regulations, to the pilots using the airport to
use reasonable care to keep the airport free from hazards
or to warn of hazards not known to the pilots.
28
The controlling issue was whether a bird problem ex-
isted at the airport which required the issuing of warn-
ings. 129  The court considered the testimony of
ornithologists as to what attracted the birds to the air-
122 Id. at 1225.
1'- Id. at 1224-25.
'24 Id. at 1225. The court noted that the FAA's airport certification program had
been in operation only since 1973. Id.
12,5 Id.
120 Id.
,27 Id. at 1225-26.
"" Id. at 1226. The court cites the following:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public
while they are upon the land for such purpose, for physical harm
caused by the accidental . . . harmful acts of . . . animals, and by
the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm,
or otherwise protect them against it.
Id. at 1226 n.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965)).
1219 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1226.
field. 30 The court also discussed the physical attributes
and habits of the birds, finding that gulls pose a particular
danger to aircraft because, when frightened, the gulls take
off in a mass, moving straight up with their long wings
outstretched.' 31
The court, acknowledging the difficulty in completely
eliminating a bird problem, found the airport operator
could have utilized a NOTAM to inform pilots about the
bird hazard. 32 Failure to issue the NOTAM was the con-
trolling factor in the court's imposition of liability on the
airport operator.1 13 The court found that since the regu-
lations require airport operators to issue NOTAMs, the
failure to issue a NOTAM is "additional proof of the [air-
port operator's] negligence."' 3 4 The court held that the
proximate cause of the crash was the failure to warn the
pilot of the presence of birds. 35 The court did not find
any negligence on the part of the Flight Service Station
(FSS) personnel on duty at the airport. 36  It based this
finding on the fact that airport inspection is not a duty of
the FSS personnel, but the duty of the airport
management. 37
,so Id. at 1227.
is, Id. The ornithologist testified that birds are particularly drawn to runways
during wet weather since rain forces worms out of their holes onto the runway and
the runway also provides firm footing for the birds. Id. at 1227.
132 Id. at 1228. "Virtually nothing... would guarantee that gulls would not be
present." Id.
153 Id.
134 Id. The regulation requiring the issuance of a NOTAM for birds is 14 C.F.R.
§ 139.69 (1985). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
135 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1229.
156 Id.
137 Id. at 1229-30. The court stated: "Federal regulations in 14 C.F.R. Part 139
indicate that it appears to be the airport operator's duty to identify safety problems
on the airport and to disseminate this information by NOTAMs." Id. at 1230. See
also 14 C.F.R. § 139.91 (1985) which provides that:
(a) The operator of each certificated airport shall continually review
its self inspection program to insure that prompt and accurate cor-
rective action is taken to eliminate unsafe conditions on the airport.
(b) The operator shall-
(1) Conduct a safety inspection of the airport at least once each day,
except as otherwise authorized in its approved airport operations
manual; and
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Furthermore, the district court did not find any negli-
gence on the part of the pilot for his failure to see the
birds on the runway prior to takeoff.' 38  The court, ac-
knowledging that the "pilot in command of an aircraft is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the
operation of that aircraft,' '1 39 found that the pilot and co-
pilot followed normal operating procedures, took reason-
able precautions, and most importantly, checked for any
NOTAMs issued for the airport. 14 0 The court found that
the pilot did not blindly or heedlessly proceed into a
"zone of danger."" '  Judgment for the full value of the
destroyed aircraft was entered against the airport
operator. 142
In Insurance Co. of North America v. City of New Haven, 143 a
Cessna Citation crashed at the Tweed-New Haven Air-
port, Connecticut, on October 16, 1975, after ingesting
gulls on takeoff.' 44 The district court noted that "during
the mid-1960's, it became increasingly apparent to those
involved in aviation that birds were a serious hazard to air
traffic."' 145 Birds were a known hazard at the airport. 146 In
determining whether the operator acted negligently, the
court applied traditional negligence principles: the plain-
tiff had to establish that the airport operator owed them a
duty of due care, that this duty was breached, and that the
breach of the duty proximately caused the lOSS.' 4 7
The court found that an airport operator has "the duty
of exercising reasonable care and control to protect its in-
vitees from dangers which might reasonably be antici-
(2) Conduct an additional safety inspection whenever required by
the circumstances ....
Id.
Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1230.
Id. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1985).
140 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1231.
141 Id. at 1234.
14' Id.
143 574 F. Supp. 373 (D. Conn. 1983).
144 Id. at 374.
145 Id. at 375.
14; Id.
1.7 Id. at 376-77.
pated to arise from the condition of the premises or the
activities taking place there."1 48 Since birds were a known
hazard at the airport, it was evident that the airport opera-
tor owed a duty to pilots using the airport to exercise rea-
sonable care to remedy the existing bird hazard, or at
least to warn unsuspecting pilots of the peril.' 49
The court reviewed the measures taken by the airport
operator to reduce the bird hazard. 50  The court found
no evidence showing that the airport operator maintained
any bird attractions. 15  To scare birds from the airfield,
the airport operator drove an automobile at the flocks
while sounding the horn. 52 The plaintiff contended that
the operator should have used alternative scare devices,
namely a recorded gull's distress call coupled with the use
of a shotgun firing shellcrackers and, on occasion, live
ammunition. 53
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs contention,
finding that at the time of the accident, the car horn was a
reasonable scare device. 5 4 However, the court did note
that the NOTAM "is and was" the generally accepted
method of advising pilots of a bird hazard. 55 The airport
operator had failed to issue a NOTAM and, consequently,
the court found the failure to do so constituted
negligence. 156
Although the airport operator was negligent in failing
to issue a NOTAM, the court found that the proximate
-4 Id. at 377.
140 Id.
150 Id. at 377-79.
15, Id. at 377-78.
152 Id. at 378.
153 Id.
154 Id.
,-. Id. at 379. "It is reasonable to assume that pilots, if on notice that there were
bird concentrations at an airport, in the exercise of due care, would take caution-
ary measures to avoid possible bird strikes." Id. NOTAMs are available to pilots
at Flight Service Stations and are printed in the Airmen's Information Manual. Id.
at 378-79.
,-o Id. at 379. "In the court's opinion, prudent care required the issuance of a
NOTAM concerning the bird aircraft hazard . . . . The failure to do so consti-
tuted negligence." Id.
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cause of the crash was the failure of the co-pilot to inform
the pilot of his sighting of birds prior to the takeoff roll. t5 7
The court found that the pilot was familiar with the air-
port and that if he had been informed by his co-pilot of
the presence of birds, he would have taken actions to min-
imize the possibility of bird ingestion. 158 The court found
no negligence on the part of the air traffic controllers at
the airport, since it was not their responsibility to perform
physical inspection of the runway areas.' 59
The decision in New Haven, like prior bird ingestion
cases, is a product of extensive data gathering and inten-
sive analysis of the bird problem at the airport, including
the testimony of a bird expert. The decision also notes
the factor of the pilot's responsibility and negligence
which can be presented as a defense by the airport opera-
tor.' 60 However, it would not be advisable to place great
reliance on the court's approval of the car horn as the sole
scare device.16 ' The general consensus is that a variety of
scare devices and tactics must be used, and varied, so the
birds do not get used to them. 162
Overseas National Airways v. United States' 61 represents the
most recent bird ingestion case. The action arose out of
the crash and explosion of a DC-10 aircraft at New York's
John F. Kennedy International Airport on November 12,
1975. 164 The aircraft struck a flock of seagulls during
takeoff causing one of the engines to catch fire.t 65 No one
was injured but the aircraft was destroyed. 166 The case
highlights the possible disastrous consequences of bird
ingestion involving a widebody passengerjet. There were
no serious injuries since all one hundred and thirty-nine
157 Id.
.- Id. at 380.
139 Id.
' Id.
See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
See Graham, supra note 1, at 24.
'6. 766 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1985).
-4 Id. at 98.
65 Id.
,,' Id. at 99.
passengers were airline employees who had prior emer-
gency aircraft evacuation training. 167
The plaintiff brought suit in federal court under the
FTCA claiming that the FAA acted negligently in certify-
ing the aircraft's engines, in certifying the airport, and in
clearing the plane for takeoff.168 The United States initi-
ated a third party action against the airport operator
claiming that the city negligently operated a garbage
dump close to the airport that attracted the birds.' 69
While the decision does not directly address the issue of
the imposition of liability, the crash itself is noteworthy in
that it prompted the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) to make recommendations for a more ef-
fective bird control system at JFK and nearby LaGuardia
and Newark International, as well as changes in the design
of the engine to make it more "birdproof."'' 7 0  The air-
craft accident report states: "The complexity of control-
ling bird populations on or around airports requires
ecological and ornithological studies before an effective
program can be formulated."' 7' The statement highlights
the need for preventive measures rather than mere dis-
persal of birds on an airport.
C. Varig
A majority of the reported bird ingestion decisons have
alleged negligence on the part of the Government in certi-
167 Graham, supra note 1, at 24.
- Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99.
-6, Id. The United States and the airport operator sought contribution and in-
demnification from the municipal garbage dump operator. Id.
170 See N.T.S.B. Rep. No. NTSB-AAR-76-19, Aircraft Accident Report, Over-
seas National Airways, Inc., Douglas DC-10-30, N1032F, John F. Kennedy Inter-
national Airport, Jamaica, New York, November 12, 1975 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as NTSB Report]. The recommendations included requiring a physical in-
spection of runways prior to designation as active and recommending the elimina-
tion of a nearby garbage dump. Id. at 25.
'7' NTSB Report, supra note 170, at 21. The report further states: "An airport
certification inspector, who is aeronautically orientated, can determine that birds
represent a serious problem at an airport, but he cannot evaluate the technical
aspects of the problem to determine which bird reduction program will be effec-
tive." Id.
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fying aircraft and airports. Although, with the exception
of Rapp, 172 the Government escaped liability, it appeared
that there was a possibility of liability for negligent certifi-
cation. 173 In 1984 that possibility was put to rest. The
United States Supreme Court in United States v. S.A. Em-
presa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)17' held
that the Government was not liable for negligence in cer-
tifying aircraft for use in commercial aviation. 7 5 The
Government was sued under the FTCA for negligently
certifying an aircraft which did not comply with FAA stan-
dards. 176 The Court held that these actions were barred
by the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. 177
The opinion can be summed up by the following lan-
guage: "[Tlhe FAA has a statutory duty to promote safety in
air transportation, not to insure it.' 7  The decision, as
one commentator states, "safeguards the certification
process of the FAA in its entirety."' 179 The net effect in a
bird ingestion case is that, unless the good samaritan doc-
trine can be invoked, the Government is no longer a via-
ble defendant. 8 0  Vang would seem to preclude suit for
negligent certification of aircraft, engines, and airports.' 8
The regulations merely set the minimum standards and
place the full burden of compliance on the manufacturer,
carrier, or airport operator. 8 2
172 For a discussion of Rapp, see supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
,73 See Comment, It's A Bird, It's A Plane, It's The FAA: Government Liability For
Negligent Airworthiness Certification, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 247 (1979).
,74 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
75 Id. at 2769.
176 For a discussion of Varig, see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act - U.S. Not Liable
For Negligence In Certifying Aircraft For Use In Commercial Aviation, 10 AIR L. 106
(1985). See also Comment, United States v. Varig Airlines: The Supreme Court Narrows
The Scope of Government Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 J. AIR L. & COM.
197 (1985).
177 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2755.
178 Id.
7,9 See Note, supra note 176, at 108.
6) Id. For a discussion of the good samaritan doctrine see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
"'" See Note, supra note 176, at 108.
182 Id.
III. STRATEGIES
The reported decisions, when read in the light of Vang,
establish the various limitations on the theories of liability
and defense in bird ingestion cases. The cases also
demonstrate that bird ingestion litigation is a sophisti-
cated, complex, and factually dependent undertaking.
From the plaintiffs perspective, it is elementary that the
airport operator, and possibly the airport manager indi-
vidually, should be named as defendants. However, if the
airport operator is a governmental entity, it may be im-
mune from suit. If immunity is determined not to exist or
if immunity is waived by the presence of liability insur-
ance, the plaintiff may proceed under a two-prong negli-
gence attack. The first prong is under general negligence
principles. The second is alleging specific violations of
airport regulations, if the airport is certificated.1 83 The
most successful litigation strategy is proving that a bird
hazard was known to exist and the airport operator failed
to warn those using the airport of the hazard by use of a
NOTAM.
If the factual circumstances merit, a suit against the
United States might be maintained under the good samar-
itan doctrine. 84 To date, the carrier has escaped liability
as a defendant. 8 5 Liability could be predicated on the
carrier's disregard of the presence of birds, or warnings of
the presence of birds, at or near the airport. Likewise, the
engine manufacturer has escaped liability. A suit might
be maintained if the facts demonstrate a disregard for the
engine regulations. 86
For counsel representing an airport operator defend-
ant, it is paramount to establish that a bird hazard did not
exist, or if one did exist, that the airport operator had
done all that could reasonably be expected to control the
hazard. The most effective defense is to show compliance
"'s See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
,85 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 10:5 at 583 (1979).
116 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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with the airport regulations, especially the issuing of
NOTAMs. A second effective defense is to prove that the
pilot's failure to take notice of the bird hazard was the
proximate cause of the crash. The pilot's negligence may
also be used to mitigate the amount of damages, particu-
larly if the pilot was familiar with the airport or had knowl-
edge of the hazard. Pilots can assist in the reduction of
bird hazards by first, becoming aware of the frequency
and danger of a bird strike; second, reporting the pres-
ence of birds to the airport operator; and third, filing a
Bird Strike/Incident Report with the FAA if a strike
occurs. 18 7
The reported decisions establish the need for exhaus-
tive investigation and documentation. It is essential to
obtain an ornithologist to assist in evaluating the bird
population at the airport. In sum, the burden falls on the
airport operator to prevent or remedy the presence of
birds at or near the airport.1 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Birds constitute a definite aviation hazard. The cases
and literature discussing the problem of bird control sug-
gest that there is no way to completely solve the problem
birds may create at airports other than wholesale slaugh-
ter of the birds upon arrival. This "scorched earth" pol-
icy is a choice of last resort. If a bird hazard does not
exist, the airport operator should make sure that condi-
181 See Steenblik, supra note 6, at 22. The Bird Strike/Incident Report is FAA
Form 5200-7. The "standard advice" given to pilots in the event they should
encounter a flock of birds in flight is to to climb, since birds in flight usually de-
scend when frightened. When flying in the vicinity of birds, it is recommended to
reduce airspeed below cruise where feasible, to give the birds a chance to avoid
the aircraft. Reducing speed also reduces the force of impact should a collision
occur. The use of the external aircraft lights, particularly strobe lights, has been
recommended to make the aircraft more conspicuous to birds. See The Feather
Curtain, FAA GENERAL AVIATION NEWS, July - Aug. 1984 at 9.
1"" "Millions of dollars may depend upon early recognition of the potential lia-
bilities of airport facility operators for an aircraft accident." Foreman, Liabilities of
Operators of Airport Facilities For Aircraft Accidents, 3 FORUM 5 (1967). See also Camp-
bell, Legal Responsibilities of Small Aiport Owners - A Growing Problem, 35 INS. COUNS.
J. 253 (1968).
tions do not develop which might attract birds. If a bird
problem exists, a system of bird detection and control
must be employed. Bird control takes two forms: short
term dispersal techniques and long term preventive meas-
ures. Both are necessary for the implementation of an ef-
fective bird control program. 189
A system of airport bird control should include regular
logged runway patrols. Inactive runways should be in-
spected prior to activation. Patrols should utilize vehicles
which can be used to scare birds and to insure that bird
control personnel can proceed quickly to the birds' loca-
tion. Any natural or man-made bird attractions which
provide food sources or roosting areas should be re-
moved. t90 Species specific distress calls played over loud-
speakers mounted on the airfield or on the bird control
vehicles, the use of shellcrackers, carbide cannons, and
even live ammunition should be used to disperse the
birds.' 9 1 Falconry has been used at some airports with
success. 192 Some airports display dead birds or model
predatory birds as scare devices. 193 Also, chemicals may
be applied to the area or tainted food could be used to
repel the birds. Ornithologists should be consulted to de-
vise methods to reduce or remove bird populations.
According to the current law, at least one measure is
imperative: A warning must be issued to those who use
the airport.'94 While the above methods will not com-
189 For an excellent collection of international materials on bird hazard see
WILDLIFE HAZARDS, supra note 8, which contains 38 papers, the majority dealing
with bird hazard reduction. The report, D.O.T. Rep. No. DOT/FAA/AAS/84-1,
is available from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia
22161. See also Hughes, Air Traffic Control And Airport Authorities - The U.K. View-
point, 9 AIR L. 202, 210-211 (1984).
- See Horne, supra note 16, at 128.
19, See Steenblik, supra note 6, at 21.
92 See Home, supra note 16, at 128.
"' Id.
" See supra notes 114-159 for a discussion of cases where the airport operator
was found to be negligent for failing to issue a NOTAM. See also 50 Fed. Reg.
43,114 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 139) (proposed Oct. 25, 1985)
which provides:
(a) Each certificate holder shall provide at least one of the following
1986] COMMENT 1033
1034 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
pletely insulate an airport operator from liability, they do
represent currently accepted methods of dealing with a
possibly devastating natural hazard.' 95 Based on the re-
ported decisions, the airport operator is generally the
means for disseminating to pilots who may wish to use the airport
information concerning conditions on, and in the vicinity of, the air-
ports that affect, or may affect, the safe operation of aircraft:
(1) The Notices to Airmen System.
(2) Any other means acceptable to the Administrator.
(b) Each certificate holder shall report the following conditions:
(7) The presense of a bird hazard or potential bird hazard.
Id.
195 See also 50 Fed. Reg. 43,113-114 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 139)
(proposed Oct. 25, 1985) which provides:
(a) Each certificate holder shall indicate to the Administrator
whether or not a bird hazard exists on the airport. If a hazard exists,
an ecological study shall be conducted by a qualified biologist. The
study shall -
(1) Identify the species, numbers, locations, local movements and
daily and seasonal occurrence of birds observed in the airport area;
and the species that have been or are likely to be involved in
bird/aircraft strikes;
(2) Identify and locate features on and near the airport that attract
birds, such as garbage disposal and water areas: and
(3) Assess the potential hazard from various bird species within
the airport area.
(b) The results of the ecological study shall be the basis for the
development by the certificate holder, with technical assistance from
the Administrator, of an airport bird management plan. The plan
shall provide measures to alleviate bird hazards at the airport and
shall include the following:
(1) To the extent practicable, priorities for needed habitat modifi-
cation and changes in land use, with target dates for completion.
(2) Procedures for:
(i) The operation of bird patrols, and for coping with daily and
seasonal high hazard periods.
(ii) Communications between air traffic control towers, pilots, and
airport bird-management personnel.
(iii) Evaluation and review of the bird management plan.
(3) Personnel and equipment needs.
(4) Training programs.
(c) When a bird hazard exists, the certificate holder shall show
that it has the capability and equipment for dispersing potentially
hazardous birds. When such occasions arise, the certificate holder
shall comply with the following:
(1) For an airport with an operating air traffic control tower, con-
duct physical inspections of a runway and adjacent areas prior to
that runway being designated the active runway or prior to aircraft
operations on other than the active runway. Bird dispersal proce-
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There is no way to eliminate the possibility of bird
strike or ingestion. But, the hazard may be reduced and
controlled by land modification, scare devices, and by al-
erting those using the airport of the presence of birds by
the use of Notices to Airmen (NOTAM). The long term
solution is to determine what specific species constitute
the bird hazard and then develop a system of habitat ma-
nipulation tailored to that species. Man and bird have and
will continue to share the skies, save an occasional run in.
In the interim, the best advice to those who must share
airspace with our feathered friends is "keep your eye on
the birdie."
dures shall be carried out as often as necessary to minimize the haz-
ard.
(2) For airport with no operating air traffic control tower, inspect
runways and adjacent areas as required by local conditions, and
carry out bird dispersal procedures as often as necessary to minimize
the hazard.
Id.
The FAA states: "It is not anticipated that the proposal would require any airport
to change or expand its bird management program." Id. at 43,103. However,
when compared with the present regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 139.67 (1985) (discussed
supra at notes 26-31), the proposal arguably places a heavier burden on the airport
operator.
11.,; See also Note, A./S. Fred Olsens Flyselkskap v. Norwich City Council and Norfolk
County Council. 5 AIR L. 35 (1980)(discussing an unreported English decision im-
posing liability on the airport operator for a bird ingestion accident); du Perron,
Liability of the Air Traffic Control Agencies and Airport Operators in Civil Law Jurisdictions,
10 AIR L. 203, 213-14 (1985)(discussing an unreported Dutch bird ingestion case
imposing liability on the airport operator).
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